Thesis Title
The Role of Deception in Explaining the Intersection of Weak States and Nuclear Proliferation
For my masters thesis, my mind zeroed-in on the concept of threat perception. Drawing from the work of Robert Jervis, I argued that minor power leaders don't really want the bomb, they simply want others to think that they have it. They are in the game of deception. They go after all the toys and whistles, like acquiring uranium, centrifuges, and starting the nuclear fuel cycle; however, minor power leaders may not intend on following through the nuclearization process. They may not declare that they are a nuclear weapon state and they do not test nuclear weapons. I argued that such leaders merely toy with the perceptions of other foreign leaders. This idea is not new in its entirety. In the nuclear weapons proliferation literaure, scholars generally refer to this as opaque proliferation. Here is a good article on the topic.
Dissertation Title
Existential Threats and the Militarization of Minor Powers: Why Leaders Choose to Pursue and Acquire Nuclear Weapons and Why Some Give Them Up Whereas Others Do Not
During my doctoral studies, my mind focused right back on the topic of threat perception and minor power proliferation. Drawing upon the rivalry literature in the research of international relations, I argued that a minor power leader's perception of an existential threat determines whether or not s/he will make the decision to commence a nuclear weapons program. It also plays a role in whether the leader will decide to dismantle the state's nuclear weapons arsenal. I also focused on the factors that affect the length of time to acquire nuclear weapons, once a weapons program has started. You can find an excerpt of my dissertation here.